Autonomy and the emotions by Christine Tappolet
AbstrAct
can actions caused by emotions be free and 
autonomous? The rationalist conception of au-
tonomy denies this. Only actions done in the 
light of reflective choices can be autonomous 
and hence free. I argue that the rationalist con-
ception does not make room for akratic actions, 
that is, free and intentional actions performed 
against the agent’s best judgement. I then de-
velop an account inspired by Harry Frankfurt 
and David shoemaker, according to which an 
action is autonomous when it is determined by 
the agent’s most central cares, where cares are 
defined in terms of emotional dispositions. 
Keywords: freedom, autonomy, emotions, care, 
weakness of will 
the emotions we feel determine a great many of our actions. The fear 
I experience when being threatened by a 
bear can cause me to run away; the love 
I feel for a friend can make me give her 
a present; compassion can prompt me 
to help a blind person to cross the road. 
In certain cases, emotions interfere with 
free agency. For example, an agoraphobic 
whose fear makes it impossible for him to 
leave his home can hardly be said to be a 
free agent. A traditional question is wheth-
er all the actions caused by the experience 
of an emotion are like this or whether they 
can be, and even sometimes are, free.
This question is related to issues about 
moral responsibility and blame. It is 
natural to think that if an action lacks 
freedom, then we cannot be held mor-
ally responsible for it. If the agoraphobic’s 
failure to go to an appointment is not 
free, it is not clear that he can be consid-
ered morally responsible for not having 
done so. The fault seems to lie not with 
him but with his condition. Also, it is far 
from clear that we should blame the ago-
raphobic for missing his appointment. 
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Again, it rather seems that it is his condition that is to blame. Quite generally, it is often 
considered that a crime committed under the influence of strong emotions or passion 
– what is called “crime passionnel” in French – is less blameworthy, morally and legally, 
than cold-blooded crime.
to answer the question whether or not actions caused by emotions can be free it is 
necessary to have a better idea of what free action requires. As gary Watson (1987) un-
derlines, freedom issues have traditionally been divided into two according to the scho-
lastic distinction between liberty of indifference and liberty of spontaneity, a distinction 
which plays an important role in David Hume’s thinking (t, 2.3.2). These two questions 
are a) that of the availability of alternative possibilities and b) that of autonomy (or self-
determination). Any conception of free action has to account for the fact that an action 
appears to be free if and only if it is true a) that the agent could have done otherwise, 
and b) that it is really the agent himself who is the source of the action.
It could be thought that a quick argument gets one to the conclusion that actions caused 
by emotions lack freedom. Agents who act under the spell of emotions cannot do oth-
erwise, so how could they be free? This argument, however, is far from convincing. It 
is plausible that most emotions only have an impact on the kind of options that are 
considered by an agent. In particular, negative emotions such as anger, fear or jealousy 
appear to reduce the number of options that are considered, while positive emotions 
such as joy seem to have the opposite effect. As such, this is something that does not 
constitute a threat to free agency. such emotions simply direct the agent’s attention 
toward a set of options and make them salient, without fully determining the exact 
course of action, so that choice remains necessary. However, suppose that our emotions 
fully determine what actions are performed. This does not yet mean that the actions in 
question lack freedom. As a compatibilist would underline, the absence of alternative 
options does not entail that the action is unfree. According to this admittedly modest 
conception of freedom, it is sufficient for free agency that the agent would have acted 
differently had his motivation been different. The compatibilitst can thus say that al-
though the action of the agent is fully determined by an emotion, so that he could not 
have acted differently given this emotion, it is nonetheless true that had the emotion 
been different, or had the agent not had this emotion, he would have acted differently. 
since I want to concentrate on the question whether emotions threaten free agency, 
and not on the question whether free agency as such is possible, I shall assume that a 
compatibilist account of this kind is true.
What about the autonomy issue? Quite generally, one can contrast two radically differ-
ent conceptions of autonomy, which come with radically different verdicts as to wheth-
er emotions and free agency are compatible or not. According to the view that is most 
common in philosophy, and that one could call the rationalist conception, emotions as 
such do not allow for autonomous actions.  Emotions are claimed to be passive states, 
which are external to our essence as rational agents.
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In a particularly telling passage, Laura Waddell Ekstrom wonders why one should 
think that our passions, which she considers on a par with whims and impulses, do not 
allow us to act autonomously. she worries that the rationalist conception might be too 
intellectualist. Here is her answer: “In my view, we do not act autonomously in acting 
on passions, whims, and impulses because these overtake us; we are generally passive 
with respect to them, they do not engage our understanding or capacity for reflective 
evaluation. We make our lives more our own by examining such impulses and by acting 
in accordance with our evaluations” (2005, p. 160).
The intuition at the heart of the rationalist conception is that only actions done in the 
light of a choice that follows the verdict of deliberation could be autonomous and hence 
free. It is thanks to reflection, a process that results in value judgements capable of jus-
tifying our actions, that we are able to determine our actions ourselves. That is why we 
could summarize the rationalist conception by the slogan: the agent is constituted by 
his reason.
The rationalist conception of autonomy corresponds to what stefaan cuypers (2000) 
calls the ‘Platonic’ intuition, which he relates to the tradition of the Enlightment and 
according to which autonomy depends on lucidity and reflectiveness. As cuypers un-
derlines it, there is another conception of autonomy that corresponds to the intuition, 
which he characterises as ‘Nietzschnean’ and which goes back to the romantic tradi-
tion. According to this second conception, reflection is a threat to authenticity and 
autonomy. given the traditional opposition between reason and emotions, it is natural 
to maintain that, for the romantic conception, emotions are central to autonomy. An 
attractive idea is that the emotions we experience are intimately related to who we are, 
for they reveal what we care for. According to this suggestion, the different emotional 
dispositions we have would determine who we are. Thus, the emotions would consti-
tute the very condition of autonomy.
I shall start with a general objection against the rationalist conception of autonomy, 
namely, its incompatibility with weakness of the will. I shall then discuss the view de-
fended by David shoemaker, stefaan cuypers and Harry Frankfurt, according to which 
our cares are essential to our autonomy. I argue for a duly pruned-down version of this 
view, which gives up the claim that we have to endorse or recognize our cares, as well 
as the claim that such cares produce volitional necessity.
1. An objection against the rationalist conception of autonomy
According to what is often considered to be the paradigmatic rationalist conception 
of autonomy, namely gary Watson’s account (1975), autonomous actions are actions 
that are justified by value judgements. As Watson writes: “Only evaluations can give 
one reasons to oppose first-order desires, and when and only when agents’ behaviour 
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expresses their evaluations are they sources and ‘authors’ of (because they ‘authorized’) 
their behaviour.” (1987, p. 149) Using susan Wolf ’s (1993) notion of the real self, that is, 
the part of the self that has to determine an action for it to be autonomous, here is how 
one could summarize Watson’s account:
(1) A motivation is part of the real self of an agent iff it corresponds to the agent’s evalu-
ation.
As Watson himself has underlined (1987), there are a number of problems with this 
suggestion. The problem I would like to underline, however, is that this account pro-
duces counter-intuitive results with respect to akratic actions; in other words, actions 
which manifest weakness of the will. such actions are performed against the better 
judgment of the agent, such as when I light a pipe and start smoking it while judging 
that, all things considered, it would be better not to smoke this pipe, since I am con-
vinced it would be better to stop smoking altogether.  It is generally acknowledged that 
an agent who acts against his judgement can be free. Indeed, akratic action is often de-
fined as a free and intentional action, which is performed in spite of the judgement that, 
all things considered, another action would be better.1 However, according to Watson’s 
account, such an action cannot be free: it clearly lacks autonomy. The reason for this 
lack of autonomy is simply that the motivation that produces the action is not part of 
the real self of the agent since it opposes the agent’s judgement.2 
The question whether akratic actions can be free or not is controversial. On both sides 
of the debate, however, it is agreed that there are at least apparent cases of free and in-
tentional actions that are performed in spite of the judgement that all things considered 
another course of action would have been better. In the absence of strong reasons to 
deny that they are possible, it would seem that the possibility of such actions has to be 
acknowledged.
Here is what could be considered such a reason. It could be argued that there is a good 
reason to think that akratic actions lack autonomy, and hence that they would also lack 
freedom. Is it not obvious, after all, that akratic agents lack self-control? And is not 
self-control central to autonomy? This is the intuition that is behind Alfred Mele’s claim 
that autonomy is essentially the absence of weakness of will (Mele 1995).3 However, 
contrary to what is widely accepted, it is important to distinguish self-control and au-
tonomy. self-control, or at least self-control as usually understood, is control exercised 
1 see Davidson 1963 and Mele 1987.      
2 since Watson also considers that it is not possible to freely act against one’s better judgement (1977), this ob-                   
jection should not worry him. In a nutshell, the argument he gives is that akratic actions cannot be distinguished 
from compulsive actions, for one cannot choose to act against one’s better judgement. so, it has to be concluded 
that the agent was unable to resist the rebellious desire. The problem is that it is far from clear that choice has to 
follow the agent’s better judgement. Note that Watson nonetheless seems to consider akrasia to be a problem for 
his account of autonomy (1987).
3 given that Mele (1987) also claims that akratic actions can be free, it seems he has to deny that free agency                      
presupposes autonomy. but see Mele 2002 for the claim that akratic actions can be both free and autonomous.
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by the agent’s reason over his desires and other first-order appetites. self-control is 
hence the opposite of weakness of will. An agent exercising self-control acts according 
to his value judgements. by contrast, autonomy is the determination of the action by 
what really constitutes the agent, i.e. by his real self. Whether it is the opposite of weak-
ness of will depends on what the real self of the agent is considered to be.
to assimilate self-control to autonomy is to assume that value judgements of an agent 
have to rule over his other mental states. This rationalist assumption should not be 
simply taken as a fact. There are good reasons to question it. to see this, it is useful to 
consider the well-known example of Mark twain’s character, Huckleberry Finn.4 At 
one point during Huck’s journey down the Mississipi river, he has the opportunity to 
give his friend Jim, a runaway slave, back to his owner. Although he thinks that this is 
what he should do, his conscience prevents him doing so. This example has been used 
to illustrate the claim that it can be more rational to act against one’s better judgement 
than to follow this judgement5.  According to the usual reconstruction of the case, Huck 
judges that all things considered he should give Jim back to his owners, but he nonethe-
less decides not to do it. Although Huck’s judgement is the outcome of his deliberation, 
it is easy to imagine that his decision is more rational than the one to give Jim back to 
his owners. One just has to suppose that there are different considerations that Huck 
would have taken into account if he had thought harder about the case – after all, Jim 
was his friend, Jim trusted him, and Jim desired to be free. Thus, the judgement that 
Huck arrived at was hasty. given this, it would not be particularly rational to act upon 
it. On the contrary, it would have been more rational not to follow such a judgement. 
Once it is accepted that Huck’s action is more rational than the one that would have 
followed his better judgement, even a rationalist could accept that the action is also 
autonomous. As we shall soon see, however, other cases show that autonomy and ratio-
nality can part company.
This intuition is confirmed by the fact that, as Arpaly and schroeder (1999) note, it 
is natural not only to praise Huck’s action, but Huck himself. Huck might not be as 
admirable as someone who overtly condemns slavery, but it seems clear that Huck has 
a better character than someone who would not have suffered from weakness of will 
and who would have turned Jim in. As Arpaly and schroeder write: “One does not only 
think helping Jim was a good thing for Huckleberry to do, but regards Huckleberry’s 
action as saying something important about Huckleberry’s self. The reader of twain’s 
novel tends to see Huckleberry’s action not as an accidental good deed done by a bad 
boy, but as indicative of the fact that Huckleberry is, in an important sense, a good boy, 
a boy with his heart in the right place” (1999, p. 163). However, on Watson’s account, 
one would have to conclude that Huck was not really himself when he failed to turn Jim 
in. given his better judgement, one would have to conclude that Huck’s real self was in 
4 see bennett 1974; McIntyre 1993; and especially Arpaly and schroeder 1999.           
5 see McIntyre 1993.   
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favour of slavery. His action would be praiseworthy, but he himself would not. Accord-
ing to this account, Huck’s action is not performed by his real self. so, it is hard to see 
how Huck could be praiseworthy. At best, one can welcome his lack of control, given 
the doubtful ideal to which he sticks.
Now, as Arpaly and schroeder underline, this seems to be a general problem for hier-
archical theories of the real self, whether they invoke higher-order desires (Frankfurt 
1971, stump 1988), value judgements (Watson 1975), preferences concerning one’s first-
order desires (Lehrer 1990), the desire that one’s desire be rational (Velleman 1989) or 
else policies concerning which desires have to count as reasons (bratman 1999). The 
problem is that all these theories subscribe to rationalism. They divide the self into 
(contemporary equivalents) of reason and appetites and they identify the self with rea-
son. According to such theories, it is always reason (or its contemporary substitute, 
such as higher-order desires, value judgements, etc.) which wins the day when there 
is conflict between reason and appetite. However, as Arpaly and schroeder write, “it is 
clear that any real self theory that identifies the agent’s real self with her reason rather 
than her Appetite, regardless of technical details, is not going to do justice to cases such 
as Huckleberry Finn’s.” (1999, p. 170) For what can be considered to be Huck’s rational 
part tells him to turn Jim in, while it is his appetite that prevents him doing so. In so far 
as Huck’s real self is considered to be (a contemporary equivalent of) his reason, Huck 
cannot be praiseworthy for his action. This seems plainly false.
Now, we have seen that Huck’s action is more rational than the action that he would 
have performed had he followed his better judgement. Therefore, it might be thought 
that what is important for autonomous action is that the action reflects the reasons the 
agent has, whether he acts on his better judgement or not. The intuition behind this 
thought is that by reflecting the reason an agent has, the action would not merely be the 
effect of some non-rational cause; something which can be thought incompatible with 
free agency. As cases of irrational akrasia show, however, this will not do. If one allows 
for free action, performed against a better judgement that reflects the agent’s reasons, 
it has to be agreed that one can act autonomously while acting irrationally. One can be 
oneself while being irrational. 
If one thinks of the fact that Huck is motivated by the emotions he feels, such as sympa-
thy and love, it is tempting to think that autonomy can side with emotions. Let us thus 
turn to a radically different account of the real self, according to which emotions are at 
the heart of autonomy.
2. The care account of autonomy
The emotions we feel seem to have a particularly close connection to who we are. This 
is the idea that is at the core of David shoemaker’s account of autonomy. According to 
shoemaker, our emotions constitute our real selves: “(…) the emotions we have make 
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us the agents we are” (2003, p. 94). The notion that is central to shoemaker’s account is 
that of care. This notion is taken from Harry Frankfurt’s later work (1982, 1994). Ac-
cording to Frankfurt, care (or love) has less to do with feeling and thought than with 
the presence of a certain motivational structure, which shapes an agent’s preferences 
and guides and limits his actions (1982, 1994)6. by contrast, shoemaker considers that 
cares are mainly emotional. cares involve conative elements, for at least most emotions 
involve motivations. cares also often, but not necessarily, involve evaluative elements. 
What is important to underline is that cares are not a kind of emotion, for as shoe-
maker puts it: “talk of caring is simply a way of referring to the range of emotional 
reactions one is expected to have with respect to the fortunes of the cared-for object” 
(2003, p. 94). to care for someone, or for something, consists in being disposed to un-
dergo a certain number of emotions, depending on the good or bad fortune of whom or 
what one cares for. We feel sadness when things go bad, joy when things go well, hope 
that things will go well, fear that things will go bad, and so forth. by identifying what an 
agent cares for, it is possible to explain his emotional reactions.
According to shoemaker (and in this he follows Frankfurt (1994)) our real self is con-
stituted by our cares. However, not any care will do. They have to be irresistible. Let us 
look for a moment at Frankfurt’s own account. According to Frankfurt “(o)ur essential 
natures as individuals are constituted (…) by what we cannot help caring about. The 
necessities of love, and their relative order or intensity, define our volitional boundaries. 
They mark our volitional limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as persons”7 (1994, 
p. 138). These irresistible cares define what Frankfurt calls “volitional necessities”, that 
is, motivations that force a person to act in a certain way. Paradoxically, these motiva-
tions do not constitute obstacles to our freedom. given that they are supposed to define 
the real self, irresistible cares make autonomous action possible. Here is how Frankfurt 
formulates this claim: “A person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from 
the essential character of his will. (…) the unconditional commands of love are not, as 
kant suggests, adventitious elements of a person’s will. They are essentially integral to 
it, for what a person loves is a defining element of his volitional nature. When he acts 
out of love, accordingly, his volitions do derive from the essential character of his will” 
(1994, p. 132).
cares (or love, to take Frankfurt’s other term) differ from compulsions in that the latter 
are irresistible, but foreign, forces. The reason for this is that the agent does not identify 
himself with these forces (1994, p. 136). According to Frankfurt, it is thus necessary to 
endorse one’s cares, that is, to wholeheartedly identify with them, for autonomy to be 
possible. It follows from Frankfurt’s account that the agent who acts on a volitional ne-
cessity fully stands behind his action: he is wholehearted, to use Frankfurt’s expression. 
6 see also cuypers 2000 for the claim that caring is central to autonomy.             
7 As Velleman 2002 argues, it is far from obvious that we have such volitional essences.                
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Wholeheartedness is thus necessary for free and autonomous action.8  The example 
Frankfurt uses to illustrate this claim is that of Martin Luther and his claim “Here I 
stand. I can do no other” (1982, p. 86. see also Dennett 1984, p. 133). Luther’s care for 
the idea of the reformation made it impossible for him to make any other choice.9
What is important to note is that the identification with the volitional necessities which 
derive from our cares is not optional. Thus, an agent is unable not to identify with what 
is required by his cares. As Velleman notes, Frankfurt requires “not only that the agent 
endorses the motive constraining his will but that he be unable to help endorsing it. In 
such a case, the agent has a second-order inability: the inability to will any change in his 
inability to will” (2001, p. 334). In fact, Frankfurt claims that what happens if the agent 
modifies his cares is that he becomes a different person (Frankfurt 1994).
Just as Frankfurt does, shoemaker claims that the cares that define the agent produce 
volitional necessities. And he also subscribes to the thesis that we are free and autono-
mous when we act on the basis of such volitional necessities: “(…) if free agency is 
a matter of my doing what is ultimately dependent on my cares, then free agency is 
volitional necessity. I act freely in performing X insofar as I cannot bring myself to do 
anything other than X” (2003, p. 106). The claim is not only that autonomy is possible 
when we are volitionally necessitated, but the stronger claim that autonomy requires 
volitional necessity.
by contrast with Frankfurt, shoemaker does not require that the agent identifies with 
or endorses his cares. However, shoemaker claims that the agent needs to be reflec-
tively aware of his cares. An agent has to recognise having the cares in question. shoe-
maker writes: “I am identified with those elements flowing from my cares, that is, what 
is authoritative in self-determination are those elements dependent on the emotional 
investments I recognize myself to have (2003, p. 112, my italics). shoemaker praises the 
freedom of persons who are entirely conscious of their cares and who do not have to 
make choices, since their cares determine what they will do.
A point that needs to be underlined is that we usually have different, sometimes com-
peting cares. shoemaker thus claims that freedom and autonomy depend on acting on 
one’s strongest care: “(i)f we attach free agency to willing action, then, and willing action 
consists in the action I genuinely want to do, and what I genuinely want to do depends 
on what I care most about in any particular situation, then free agency is grounded in 
8 As Velleman (2006) argues, there are reasons to think that the ideal of wholeheartedness is doubtful, since it                   
often involves the unhealthy repression of motivations that should be considered part of ourselves.
9 Frankfurt seems to allow that a wholehearted agent can have conflicting motivations, but what happens in                 
such cases is that the desires that opposes what the agent cares for gets segregated: “Wholeheartedness does not 
require that a person be altogether untroubled by inner opposition to his will. It just requires that, with respect to 
any such conflict, he himself be fully resolved. This means that he must be resolutely on the side of one of the forces 
struggling within him and not on the side of any other.” The question is whether one can still speak of conflict 
when the agent has resolutely taken side. (1999, p. 100)
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care. to the extent that what I do does not ultimately depend on my strongest care(s) at 
the time of action, I am unfree” (2003, pp. 103-104).
Putting these different claims together, we obtain the following definition:
(2) A motivation is part of the real self of an agent at the time of action iff it results from 
a care, which the agent either endorses or recognises himself to have, which produces 
volitional necessity, and which is the strongest one at the time of action.
I think there is a grain of truth in this account. However, as it stands, it clearly will 
not do. A first problem is that it would make Huck’s case less than free. Let us suppose 
that Huck helps Jim because he cares for him and that this is his strongest care at the 
time of action. It is clearly wrong to claim that Huck endorses his care: given his better 
judgement, he would rather get rid of any attachment to Jim. In the same way, Huck is 
clearly not wholehearted about his action and his motivation. Moreover, it is not clear 
Huck has to recognize himself as having this disposition towards Jim for him to act 
autonomously. In fact, one can well suppose that Huck is moved by a strong desire to 
help Jim without realizing that he cares for Jim. It thus seems that one can attribute an 
action to an agent while the agent is not aware of the care that moved him to action. 
This is confirmed by the fact that it is well-known that a person can love someone with-
out realising this. We frequently fail to realise how much we care for someone before 
separation teaches us better; but this does not mean that before becoming aware of the 
fact that her feelings are engaged, the agent’s actions are not the deeds of her real self. 
she might not realise this, but that is neither here nor there.
Another problem comes from the requirement that the cares in questions come with 
volitional necessities. If the endorsement of a care is not necessary, then being unable 
to help endorsing it cannot be necessary either. Huck neither endorses his care for Jim, 
nor is he unable to help endorsing it. In the same way, it just seems false to say that 
Huck is unwilling to will any change in his inability to will. given his better judgement, 
he surely would want to change his motivation. Moreover, it is not clear that we should 
say, as shoemaker suggests, that a free agent’s motivations have to be irresistible, in the 
sense that he cannot bring himself to do otherwise. It is clear that Huck’s motivations to 
help Jim are stronger than his motivation to refrain from helping. However, it certainly 
makes sense to say that he could have resisted his motivation had he taken the right 
steps at the right time.
Thus, it seems the care account has to be stripped down to the following claim: 
(3) A motivation is part of the real self of an agent at the time of action iff it results from 
the care that is the strongest one at the time of action.
Here are a few examples that can be considered paradigmatic cases of autonomous ac-
tion according to this account: deciding to tell the truth in spite of a promise one made 
because what one cares about most is truthfulness; spending time with a sick friend 
because one is strongly attached to this friend; moving to a different city in order to 
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live with the person one loves. to many, the suggestion that these are paradigm cases 
of autonomous actions will seem deeply wrong. Acting out of attachments or cares, 
they will claim, are just cases of determined, non-autonomous actions. to what extent 
should we believe this? 
before considering the main objections to this account, let me start by underlying one 
of its virtues. It will be clear, given the above discussion, that one advantage of the care 
account is that it entails that akratic actions are autonomous. As we have seen, it is plau-
sible to say that Huck’s action is motivated by his strongest care. Had he not cared that 
much for Jim, he would not have hesitated to give Jim back to his owners. More gener-
ally, it is plausible to claim that each time we freely act against our better judgement, we 
are motivated by what we care for most. consider the akratic smoker. In this case too, 
it seems true that in spite of his better judgement what the smoker cares most for is the 
pleasure involved in smoking his pipe.
Let us turn to the objections which can be mounted against this account. Maybe the 
most obvious problem is that there seem to be cases of autonomous actions that do not 
depend on any cares. If so, it would be just wrong to claim that our real selves are con-
stituted by our cares. As shoemaker (2003) notes, there are many actions that have ap-
parently nothing to do with our emotions and our cares. consider a standard morning: 
you get out of your bed, you stretch, you take your shower, you drink your tea, and so 
on. All these actions seem perfectly intentional and can be explained in terms of desires 
and beliefs, but they do not seem to relate to emotions or to cares. shoemaker suggests 
that such actions are just like those of the wantons described by Frankfurt. A wanton is 
characterised by the fact that he has no desires about what ought to motivate him: “Not 
only does he pursue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, 
but he does not care which of his inclinations is the strongest” (1971, p. 17). so, accord-
ing to shoemaker, in doing such things as getting out of bed, we act as unreflective be-
ings who do not care what our wills are. such actions would thus lack autonomy. There 
is, hence, no problem in admitting that they are not grounded in cares. Is this true? 
What is controversial about this reply is that shoemaker assumes that only what could 
be called ‘reflective’ actions can be autonomous. This rationalist assumption is difficult 
to square with an account that puts care at the heart of autonomy. As we have seen, 
cases of akratic action show that actions that are not the outcome of deliberation or 
reflection, but are actually contrary to what we think is the better course of action, can 
be autonomous. Moreover, shoemaker’s reply entails that it is not the agent himself 
– his real self – who gets out of the bed in the morning and who stretches. Thus, such an 
action could not count as free. This is difficult to believe. It is true that to get out of the 
bed in the morning or drinking one’s tea, usually does not require much thought. This, 
however, does not mean that the action in question is not free and hence autonomous.
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I do not think that this makes for a deep problem for the care account, however. There 
is in fact a rather obvious suggestion that allows handling such cases. The suggestion is 
simply that contrary to first impressions, such actions bear a relation to our cares. The 
agent who more or less automatically gets up in the morning can have adopted this 
habit because he cares for a certain way of life. This seems confirmed by the fact that if 
something threatened this way of life – a sudden paralysis that would prevent the agent 
from moving from his bed, for instance – it is clear that this would result in emotions 
of frustration and even despair, thus revealing that there was a care involved. The same 
seems true of most habitual actions. These actions are related to habits the agent has 
formed because of things he consciously or unconsciously cares for.
However, is it not possible that an agent acts autonomously while motivated by reason 
alone? Obviously, this would have to be denied by the advocate of the care account. He 
has to argue that when we are motivated by the conclusion of deliberation, our motiva-
tion derives at least indirectly from some care. shoemaker (2003) argues that the moral 
agent who acts out of respect for the moral law in fact cares for this law. This is certainly 
what seems to follow from the fact that a moral agent feels guilty when he fails to do 
what he thinks he ought to do. In the same way, one could point out that someone who 
acts against his better judgement on a prudential matter usually has negative feelings, 
such as guilt or shame. He thus seems to care for the prudential principles he embraces. 
In fact, it is plausible to argue that, at bottom, what is crucial to prudential deliberation 
is that the agent cares for himself. 
If this is on the right lines, cares are a necessary condition for autonomy. Are they also 
a sufficient condition? compulsive actions, such as that of the unwilling addict, take 
us to another kind of problem, that is, cases of non-autonomous actions that appear 
to derive from our strongest cares. The question is how an account which does not 
require the endorsement of care deals with compulsion. One possibility is to claim 
that the motivations of compulsive agents are independent from his cares. This is what 
shoemaker suggests: “The desires stemming from what (the unwilling addict) reflec-
tively cares most about here and now are impotent, and his will is thus impeded from 
the inside. The same goes for unwilling kleptomaniacs and others who are moved by 
some internal compulsion; motivational forces utterly independent from things they 
care about” (2003, p. 102).
The problem is that it seems difficult to deny that even the unwilling addict cares for his 
high. It is difficult to see why this care should not be considered to be the strongest one, 
given its impact on action. This is even more obvious when one thinks of the fact that 
the addict will experience a certain number of strong emotions, depending on whether 
he obtains the drug he craves for or not. In fact, shoemaker acknowledges that the ad-
dict cares to have his drug, but he claims that the reason he does is that this would allow 
him to get rid of his desire. What the unwilling addict in fact cares for is to get rid of his 
desires. The care of the addict would motivate the agent to take his drug only in so far 
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as this is instrumental to getting rid of the desire. The unwilling addict would thus have 
an instrumental desire to take the drug, based on his care to get rid of the drug-desire; 
but he would not care to have the drug as such. Thus, one could say that the desire to 
have the drug does not belong to the real self of the agent.
This story is difficult to believe. The suggestion that the unwilling addict does not care 
for the immediate and pleasurable affects of his “high”, but only tries to satisfy a desire 
he would prefer not to have, seems doubtful. It would seem more plausible to acknowl-
edge that different cares are competing. On the one hand, there is the care for the drug, 
which is in fact a care for the pleasure of the high, and on the other hand there is the 
care for a life free of drugs. The first care wins the day. Does this mean that the unwill-
ing addict’s action is autonomous after all?
In order to claim that the unwilling addict is not moved by his real self, one has to claim 
that the care for a life without drugs is the strongest care and thus defines the real self, 
though the motivation that comes with the care for the drug is stronger. How could it 
be that the strongest care is not the one that comes with the strongest motivation? What 
one would intuitively want to say is that what is necessary for a care to constitute the 
real self is that it be central to the personality of the agent, whatever its causal efficacy 
with respect to a particular action or type of action. What could this mean? 
The suggestion I would like to make, and which is inspired by Nomy Arpaly and tim 
schroeder (1999), is that that the centrality of a care depends on the integration of this 
care with the other mental states of the agent. This is what Arpaly and schroeder, who 
explain the notion of integration in terms of the concept of depth, say about of beliefs 
and desires: “A belief or desire is deep insofar as it is a powerful force in determining 
the actor’s behavior, deeply held, deep-rooted. Deep beliefs tend to resists revision (…) 
and deep desires tend to be satisfied with preference over shallower desires (…)” (1999, 
p. 173). The integration of a care manifests itself by its effect on motivation, but also by 
the number of causal links between the care and other mental states of the agent. The 
more a care is central, the more it will determine what the agent desires and what he 
thinks and feels. so, one particular care could have more causal links to what an agent 
thinks and what he feels than another care, but be less powerful than this second care 
with respect to a particular motivation. In other words, the advantage of introducing 
the distinction between the centrality and the motivational strength of cares is that one 
can claim that a motivation, which depends on a care that is on the periphery of the 
agent’s psychology can be motivationally stronger, on a given occasion, compared to 
the care which constitutes the agent’s real self. As a result, the care that determines if an 
action is autonomous or not is not necessarily the one which comes with the strongest 
motivation. It is the one that is strongest in the sense of being most central to the agent’s 
psychology.
Finally, let us consider the so-called manipulation problem. This is a problem that all 
autonomy accounts have to deal with. It is clear that our emotional dispositions are 
c. tappolet  Autonomy and the Emotions
57
shaped by our genes as well as by the socio-cultural background. However, cares can 
also be the result of manipulative processes, such as when one is the victim of hypnosis 
or brainwashing. shoemaker’s reply to the manipulation objection consists in the claim 
that our cares are ours in so far as they result from well-functioning cognitive mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms include critical reflection and self-evaluation, as well as 
mechanisms which allow our cares and our motivations to be sensitive to our thoughts. 
That these mechanisms have been tampered with would explain why the victim of hyp-
nosis or of brain-washing would not be autonomous when he acts on his cares. 
One point that has to be underlined is that it would be wrong to claim that our cares 
need to be the result of reflection. We acquire our cares long before we are able to con-
sider our own reactions in a critical way. consider our attachment to the place in which 
we have grown up, for instance. At least our initial cares depend in part on our envi-
ronment. They are not a matter of reflective choice. Moreover, as shoemaker himself 
underlines, reflection is always done on the basis of a care. It is because we care to be a 
certain kind of person that we engage in a process of self-critical reflection. It is because 
we care for the outcome of our actions that we deliberate about what to do. 
However, it seems to make sense to claim that for our cares to constitute our real auton-
omous selves, they have to have developed naturally, on the basis of a natural unfolding 
of our emotional and cognitive capacities. It has to be underlined that the concept of 
naturalness is used here in a normative way. One might object that a natural unfolding 
of our emotional and cognitive capacities thus seems to be nothing else than whatever 
process leads to autonomy. Now, it has to be agreed that there might be no general way 
to characterise cases in which there is manipulation in order to distinguish them from 
naturally grown cares. What is clear, however, is that certain ways to acquire cares are 
manipulative: if the cares an agent develops are the result of neurosurgery, hypnosis or 
brainwashing they undoubtedly fail to constitute the agent’s real self.
The upshot is that in order to take into account this last point, as well as the distinction 
between centrality and motivational strength, we have to modify the care account in 
the following way:
(4) A motivation is part of the real self of the agent iff it results from the most central 
care of the agent, and this care has developed naturally.
given this, an action would be autonomous if it is determined by the strongest, and 
thus most central care of the agent, provided this care has naturally developed. 
Conclusion
We have seen that rationalist accounts of autonomy fail to account for free actions that 
are contrary to the agent’s better judgement. by contrast, care accounts appear to have 
no problem with cases of weakness of will. As we have seen, there are reasons to be 
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doubtful of some claims made by Frankfurt and shoemaker. However, it nonetheless 
seems plausible that the real self of an agent is constituted by his most central cares, in 
so far as these cares have developed naturally; that is, in so far as they are not the result 
of manipulations. given that cares are nothing but a set of emotional dispositions, it 
follows that there is no general opposition between autonomy and emotions. On the 
contrary, if an emotion is involved in a network that constitutes an agent’s most central 
cares, the action caused by this emotion is autonomous. Apart from the emotions that 
belong to cares that are not central, such as in the case of compulsion, the only emo-
tions that would make for an exception would be those that do not depend on cares. 
However, it is not clear that emotions can be unrelated to cares.*
* I am grateful to Christine Clavien, Christopher Cowley, Josep Corbi, Paul 
Bernier, Stéphane Lemaire, Colin McLeod, Anne Meylan, Martin Montminy, 
Kevin Mulligan, Ruwen Ogien, Claude Panaccio, Fabienne Pironet, and So-
phie Rietti for comments on various versions of this paper.
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